Our Knowledge of Other Minds
REVIEWS
- Author:W. Wylie Spencer:
Yale University Press, New Haven, 1930. 145 pp.
The success of any attempt to evaluate the grounds of our belief in the existence of other minds is, as Mr. Spencer confesses, dependent upon something approximating to a clear definition of mind, to the extent that without this the problem cannot even be formulated intelligently; our criticism of the present attempt may then be leveled at the characteristics by which mind is here described. These are nine in number: Association with a body, consciousness, mental process, emotion, elasticity, attachment, detachment, coactivity, and valuation; and this reviewer fears that if he were not already familiar with some of the senses in which the term “mind” is commonly employed he would be little enlightened by these characteristics and their definition. We come out finally with the definition of mind as “a substantial 8elf, in so far as it lives through a conscious history, normally with a conception of itself as having a body, purposes, and objective causes with which it is intimately allied.” Though exception might be taken to this definition upon a number of points, we are inclined particularly to quarrel with the characterization of mind as necessarily conscious, especially because of the meaning this term has for Mr. Spencer. For he insists upon it, though he says: “The characteristic of awareness can certainly not be defined, either in terms of anything else or by description All that can be done to show that the characteristic of awareness is understood is to display the ability to tell when entities possess and when they do not possess it.” It would be interesting to know just how to go about proving the existence of such an ability.
A discussion of the argument from analogy leads to the conclusion that as heretofore stated it cannot be regarded as conclusive proof of the existence of other minds, though with certain amendments it might be given a status of high probability; but this is not insisted upon.
Consideration of certain “specific criteria” of mind brings us to the opinion that in several instances the question as to whether or not an individual conforms to the criteria is truly experimental?for example, in the cases of valuation with respect to truth, beauty, and humor. Thus, laughter in comic situations (and seriousness, we might add, in situations which are not comic) is evidence of the humor of the event having been comprehended. Many of the characteristics above mentioned may be so verified; and the question is naturally raised in the mind of the reader: Why is there no attempt made to define awareness in a similar manner, that it might be equally capable of objective investigation? Instead, the possibility of determining objectively the presence or absence of these several other characteristics is taken in a vague way as establishing a presumption in favor of the existence of consciousness where these other have been shown to exist; which does not seem to follow.
The final chapter contains a psychological explanation of the belief in other minds, with the adequacy of which we are not here concerned. But if, as we are told, we come to this belief because we find in our dealings with other beings a “response” or “reciprocity,” how still can this be considered evidence of their possession of awareness in Mr. Spencer’s use of the term? This difficulty is by no means overlooked, but the solution of it by the invocation of a new type of knowledge, which of itself seems to be as problematic in nature as the difficulty with which we started, is palpably weak and close to begging the question. Perhaps the “taking account” of another’s emotional and intellectual activity insofar as it is objectively displayed, which Mr. Spencer believes to lead us by means of a kind of intuition to knowledge of that other’s mind, is itself the only knowledge we are capable of in that direction; and if so, we need no longer seek it in the dim regions of an indefinable and indescribable awareness. Francis W. Irwin
Disclaimer
The historical material in this project falls into one of three categories for clearances and permissions:
Material currently under copyright, made available with a Creative Commons license chosen by the publisher.
Material that is in the public domain
Material identified by the Welcome Trust as an Orphan Work, made available with a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
While we are in the process of adding metadata to the articles, please check the article at its original source for specific copyrights.