The New Field of Psychology
- Author:
Madison Bentley. New York:
Appleton-Century Company, xvi -f- 439 pp.
Professor Bentley writes in the Preface to this work that a radical change has taken place in his general envisagement of the subject from the position expounded in his earlier Fields of Psychology. The publishers address the present volume not only to the new student in first year psychology courses but also to the general reader. The work invites comment therefore on the grounds of its utility for these purposes as well as on the grounds of its systematic consistency and value. Of the former aim it may be said that it has been approached by a studious aversion to experimental detail and a reliance upon homely illustration in the text of the book. In this respect it may be said to differ from many contemporary text-books. In order to add some documentary evidence to the expository material, however, and to deal further with moot points raised in the several chapters, a supplement has been incorporated into the book, which contains additional reference and expository material for each chapter. The text may be said to resemble other contemporary texts in that it is in the tradition of giving somewhat less attention to the historic problems of sensation and perception. The book offers no material on abnormal, social or comparative psychology. The understanding of the systematic position which Professor Bentley defines begins with the abandonment of such notions as mind, mental processes, states and forces. “We shall find it wholly unnecessary to assume that there is also involved another kind of agent, which men have called a mind or consciousness” (page 14). This does not, however, prevent the author from a consideration of such problems as sensation, perception, memory, imagination and thinking. These topics are discussed under the following chapter headings: The Apprehending Functions, The Patterns of Apprehension, Learning, Inspecting and Comprehending, and Elaborative Thinking.
The place of Apprehension and its associated concepts in the discussion depends upon their recognition by means of a method of defining which begins with the notion of function. By function Bentley means for the most part a “mode of operation.” It does not appear illegitimate to relate this kind of definition to the general class of objective definitions of psychological concepts, composed of definitions proposed by writers like Watson, Tolman, Singer, etc., who have in common the fact that their concepts are free from the taint of private experience. “When we say that the organism is appreREVIEWS 283 bending ^ve mean nothing more than that it is active in a manner that … lays hold of objects, events, scenes and occurrences… . The apprehending itself is a characteristic activity of the organism” (page 32). The author however does not believe himself to be a behaviorist in his new position and neither does he identify himself with the purposive behaviorists. In the place of strivings, drives, purposes, etc., he establishes the concept of goernment. This concept is not explicitly defined; its meaning is communicated by example and analogy. Under its heading are enumerated three varieties of governors, the extra-organic, the organic and the historical governors. The function of all three classes of governors is the guidance, control and regulation of the psychological functions. Perhaps it is not amiss at this point to remark that it is just such a need which has occasioned the idea of mind in many historical instances. However, the inclusion of the organic governors among the matters discussed under government distinguishes it from concepts such as mind. The organic governors are of great present significance and of undoubted future significance; the implication lies in the whole book that in neurology and physiology lie the answers to the psychological questions. It is apparent that the intention is to present a strictly naturalistic system of psychology without going over to the materialists on the important issue of the suitability of what have been the historic problems in psychology to scientific work. The success of any attempt of this kind rests with the success with which the fundamental concepts are defined, unless it is proposed to gloss over contradictions with a plea for eclecticism in systematic psychology. The relation of Bentley’s point of view to the classic systems is not completely eclectic. Structuralism and Functionalism in so far as they involve mentalisms are completely abandoned. On the other hand the data upon which the Chapters on Apprehension are written is largely the data of Titchenerian Psychology. The Gestalt point of view is denied because its cause is satisfied the development of the laws of government, particularly the extra-organic and historical governors. Behaviorism is rejected in its denial of the appropriateness of the apprehending functions to scientific method. On the other hand the whole system is beliavioristic by the definition which S. nger gave to the subject matter of psychology.
The book is distinguished by an interesting chapter on Elaborative Thinklng and by a particularly lucid discussion, on an elementary plane, of the statistical methods used in psychophysics and mental testing. An index of names and a subject index are furnished at the end of the book.
M. G. Preston “University of Pennsylvania
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